Preserving Apollo: H.R. 2617 and the Creation of the Apollo Lunar Landing Sites National Historic Park by Ellis, Kyle
Fordham Environmental Law Review
Volume 26, Number 3 2015 Article 1
Preserving Apollo: H.R. 2617 and the
Creation of the Apollo Lunar Landing Sites
National Historic Park
Kyle Ellis∗
∗Fordham University School of Law
Copyright c©2015 by the authors. Fordham Environmental Law Review is produced by The
Berkeley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/elr
PRESERVING APOLLO:
H.R. 2617 AND THE CREATION OF THE APOLLO
LUNAR LANDING SITES NATIONAL HISTORICAL PARK
Kyle Ellis*
INTRODUCTION
On July 8, 2013, Representatives Donna Edwards [D-MD] and
Eddie Johnson [D-TX] introduced H.R. 2617, The Apollo Lunar
Landing Legacy Act, to the House of Representatives. 1 With H.R.
2617, Representatives Edwards and Johnson sought to protect and
preserve the sites where the Unites States' Apollo program landed
2men and machines on the Moon. In its nine (9) sections, the bill
provides for the incorporation of those sites into the National Parks
System, their administration by the National Aeronautics and Space
Agency (NASA), and their preservation through international
recognition as a World Heritage Site.3 Upon its introduction, the bill
was referred to committee, seeking approval by the House Natural
Resources Committee as well as the House Science, Space, and
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1. Apollo Lunar Landing Legacy Act, H.R. 2617, 113th Congress, (2013)
[hereinafter H.R. 2617], available at https://www.govtrack.us/congress/
bills/1 13/hr2617/text, archived at https://perma.cc/CG6P-6ETQ.
2. Id.
3. Id.
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Technology Committee.4 The bill remained in committee throughout
the previous Congress' term, and currently has minimal prospects for
enactment in the newly-elected Congress. Despite these setbacks, as
well as the legally and practically daunting nature of such a bill, there
are signs that a bill creating a lunar addition to the National Parks
System would benefit from popular support.5
The introduction of H.R. 2617 has been another step in a series of
Congressional moves towards a greater recognition of the importance
4. See Apollo Lunar Landing Legacy Act (2013; 113th Congress H.R. 2617),
GOVTRACK.US, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr2617 (last visited
Feb. 15, 2015), archived at https://perma.cc/45UC-3G2A.
5. There was already significant interest in the protection of the Apollo landing
sites before H.R. 2617 was introduced, see, e.g., California 'protects' Apollo 11
landing site on Moon, BBC NEWS, Jan. 30, 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
8488783.stm, archived at http://perma.cc/AAS7-AXEV; NAT'L AERONAUTICS AND
SPACE ADMIN., NASA's RECOMMENDATIONS TO SPACE-FARING ENTITIES: HOW TO
PROTECT AND PRESERVE THE HISTORIC AND SCIENTIFIC VALUE OF U.S.
GOVERNMENT LUNAR ARTIFACTS, (2011) (Detailing guidelines intended to
preserve the equipment left on the Moon by the Apollo program), available at
http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/617743 main NASA-USGLUNARHISTORICSITES_
RevA-508.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/WXP9-8ZUE; Kenneth Chang, To
Preserve History on the Moon, Visitors Are Asked to Tread Lightly, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 10, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/10/science/space/a-push-for-
historic-preservation-on-the-moon.html, archived at http://perma.cc/26SL-3WH7;
Amy Teitel, NASA's Apollo Landing Sites Will Be Protected, DISCOVERY NEWS,
May 28, 2012, http://news.discovery.com/space/history-of-space/nasa-will-
preserve-apollo-landing-sites-120528.htm (Reporting that the Google Lunar X
Prize Foundation will require all participating prize contestants to adhere to the
guidelines released by NASA for approaching the Moon and preserving the Apollo
landing sites), archived at http://perma.cc/BNE6-NP3K. However, after the
introduction of the bill there has been even more interest generated in how the
landing site may be protected and whether the bill could pass international scrutiny,
see, e.g., Miriam Kramer, How to Preserve Historic Moon Landing Sites for
Posterity, SPACE.COM, Dec. 2, 2013, http://www.space.com/23769-historic-moon-
landing-sites-preservation.html, archived at http://perma.cc/386P-RD6S; Michael
Lemonick, Hands Off Our Lunar Landing Sites? Not So Fast: A new paper argues
against the wisdom of the U.S. declaring sovereignty over parts of the moon, TIME
MAGAZINE, Nov. 28, 2013, http://science.time.com/2013/11/28/hands-off-our-
lunar-landing-sites-not-so-fast/, archived at http://perma.cc/N6U8-5Y44; Leonard
David, Protection of Apollo moon landing sites creates a dust-up, NBC NEWS, Jul.
29, 2013, http://www.nbcnews.com/science/space/protection-apollo-moon-landing-
sites-creates-dust-f6C 10783695.
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of commercial space industries in the United States.6 One indication
of the growing recognition comes from Congress' acknowledgments
of the achievements of private industry in both manned and
unmanned spaceflight through House and Senate resolutions
recognizing the accomplishments of private industry. 7 Another
indication comes from the NASA initiative that provided funding to
commercial companies for the resupply of the International Space
Station (ISS) starting in 2006, and culminating in resupply contracts
being awarded to two companies whose missions began in 2012 and
continue through the present. 8 A third indication comes from the
continued development of the laws and regulations concerning space,
and the reorganization of space-related laws into Title 51 of the
United States Code in 2010.
9
The Congressional recognition of the importance of space-based
industries has been mirrored, and in some ways surpassed, by other
countries and the commercial sector.10 The explosive growth both in
6. Such moves have included official recognition of private achievements in
space industry and the beginning of legal regulations on private uses of space, see,
e.g., S. Res. 458, 108th Cong. (2004) (enacted).
7. See id.; H.R. Res. 820, 108th Cong. (2004); H.R. Res. 411, 111th Cong.
(2009); S. Res. 242 11 1th Cong. (2009).
8. See NASA, 2006 NASA STRATEGIC PLAN 17-18 (2006), available at
www.nasa.gov/pdf/142302main 2006 NASAStrategicPlan.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/K3BA-Q7AR; Press Release, NASA, NASA Awards Space Station
Commercial Resupply Services Contracts (Dec. 23, 2008), available at
http://www.nasa.gov/home/hqnews/2008/dec/HQC08-069_ISS _Resupply.html,
archived at http://perma.cc/6PUF-BVB2; Alan Boyle, Private ventures vie to
service space station: old and new players respond to NASA's call for orbital
transport, NBC NEWS, Mar. 20, 2006, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/11927039/
page/2/#.UOGc6TiYaUk, archived at http://perma.cc/8T5K-YP7Z; Press Release,
NASA, SpaceX, NASA Target Oct. 7 Launch For Resupply Mission To Space
Station (Sept. 20, 2012), available at http://www.nasa.gov/missionpages/station/
main/spacex-crsl-target.html, archived at http://perma.cc/N8CG-6PF3; NASA,
SPACE X BLOG, http://blogs.nasa.gov/spacex/, archived at http://perma.cc/AF2G-
BP2L.
9. National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 111-314, 124
Stat. 3328 (2010).
10. In particular the participation of private teams hailing from various nations
in private space-based competitions and prize funds, see, e.g., Alan Boyle,
SpaceShipOne wins $10 million X Prize, NBC NEWS, Oct. 5, 2004,
http ://www.nbcnews.com/id/6167761/#.UwAezLRFBgg, archived at
http://perma.cc/6E95-Z2CL; Leonard David, SpaceShipOne Wins $10 Million
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industry and in government space programs can also be seen
occurring in Russia," India, China, Japan, Europe, and other
countries, where each country has expanded its space program in
their own unique ways. 12 Private space programs and prize funds
have further spurred the development of commercial space activities
worldwide. 13 The sights set by both governments and industry are
high - encompassing both unmanned and manned space travel, with
rising stakes and rising interest worldwide.
1 4
Ansari X Prize in Historic 2nd Trip to Space, SPACE.COM, Oct. 4, 2004,
http://www.space.com/403 -spaceshipone-wins- 10-million-ansari-prize-historic-
2nd-trip-space.html, archived at http://perma.cc/CWR4-7BCZ; THE GOOGLE
LUNAR X PRIZE, http://lunar.xprize.org/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/7GMX-GSEX.
11. Although there has been some doubt about continued cooperation between
the Russian space programs and those of Europe and the United States due to the
problems in the Ukraine, Russia has played a vital role in maintaining the
International Space Station and other ventures, see Kenneth Chang, NASA Hitches
a Ride on a Russian Craft, and Begins a New Dependent Phase, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
12, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/13/science/space/nasa-and-russia-
begin-new-chapter-in-space.html? r-0, archived at http://perma.cc/LAR7-Q6YA;
Kenneth Chang & Peter Baker, NASA Breaks Most Contact With Russia, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 2, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/03/world/europe/nasa-
breaks-most-contact-with-russia.html, archived at http://perma.cc/5AVT-VSGA.
12. For a summary of these activities up to 2008, see Carl E. Behrens, Space
Launch Vehicles: Government Activities, Commercial Competition, and Satellite
Exports, in SPACE POLICY AND EXPLORATION (William N. Callmers, ed., 2008).
13. Although Google's Lunar X Prize is the most well-known, well-funded, and
well-regarded prize currently in contention, other prizes and programs have been
developed within the last few decades, see THE GOOGLE LUNAR X PRIZE, supra
note 10; Past Centennial Challenges, NASA, http://www.nasa.gov/directorates/
spacetechcentennial challenges/pastchallenges/index.html#.UOHzK4Xihgg (last
visited Feb. 9, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/Z89L-N83N; About Mars
One, MARS ONE, http://www.mars-one.com/about-mars-one (last visited Feb. 9,
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/2BPJ-C8EE; LiftPort Group - LiftPort Group,
LIFTPORT GROUP, http://liftport.com/we-are-liftport/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2015);
Overview, PLANETARY RESOURCES, http://www.planetaryresources.com/
company/overview/#our-vision (last visited Feb. 9, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/4LT3-E5PM.
14. The rising stakes can be seen in the astonishing growth of the space industry
over the last several years. According to the Space Foundation's 2013 Report, the
world's space-based economy has grown by 37% between 2007 and 2012, with
6.7% growth during 2012, see Press Release, Space Foundation, Space
Foundation's 2013 Report Reveals 6.7 Percent Growth in the Global Space
2015]
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As the enthusiasm of both government and industry grow, there are
fundamental legal problems with the development and growth of a
robust commercial space industry. 15 Although technical problems
pose some of the difficulties in accessing space, legal challenges
cannot be overcome through engineering and ingenuity when they
remove the incentive to develop engineering solutions in the first
place. 16 There are three fundamental legal problems facing space
commercialization: (1) the legal prohibition against ownership of
real estate in space, (2) the prohibition against extending national
sovereignty to outer space, and (3) the prohibition against extending
national legal jurisdiction to outer space.17 These same problems
also affect the ability of Representatives Edwards and Johnson to
pass H.R. 2617 and incorporate the Apollo landing sites as part of the
National Park System. H.R. 2617 faces all three problems head-on
because the bill calls upon the U.S. government to (1) take ownership
of real estate on the Moon, (2) extend its sovereignty to those sites on
the Moon, and (3) establish the Apollo Lunar Landing Sites National
Park under the legal jurisdiction of the United States.' 8
Economy in 2012 (Apr. 2, 2013), available athttp://www.spacefoundation.org/
media/press-releases/space- foundations-2 0 13 -report-reveals-67-percent-growth-
global-space-economy, archived at http://perma.cc/6TJZ-JLBP; SPACE FOUND.,
THE SPACE REPORT 2013 5-6 (2013), available at http://www.spacefoundation.org/
sites/default/files/downloads/TheSpaceReport 2013_overview.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/SY42-YP8D.
15. 0. Schachter, A Preview of Space Law Problems Warning: Early Unilateral
Positions, B. BULL. N.Y. COUNTY LAW. Ass'N, 345-48 (1958); Benjamin David
Landry, A Tragedy of the Anticommons: The Economic Inefficiencies of Space
Law, 38 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 523 (2012-2013); A.W. Salter and P.T. Leeson,
Celestial Anarchy, 34 CATO JOURNAL 581 (2014); Kelly M. Zullo, The Need to
Clarify the Status of Property Rights in International Space Law, 90 GEO. L.J. 2413
(2001-2002); M.J. Listner, The Ownership and Exploitation of Outer Space: A
Look at Foundational Law and Future Legal Challenges to Current Claims, 1
REGENT J. INT. L. 75, 75-94 (2003); Lynn M. Fountain, Creating Momentum in
Space: Ending the Paralysis Produced by the Common Heritage of Mankind
Doctrine, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1753 (2002-2003).
16. Landry, supra note 15, at 524-26 (Arguing that the 'common heritage of
mankind' and the 'shared benefit to all nations' doctrines in the Outer Space
Treaty's Articles I and II actively prevent the development of commercial uses of
outer space).
17. See infra note 78.
18. H.R. 2617, supra note 1.
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This essay will address how these fundamental legal challenges
affect H.R. 2617, and how they should be addressed by the Congress
of the United States. 19 Part I will provide the history necessary for
understanding how the three fundamental problems in space law
developed, and how they have changed in the last several decades.
Part I will provide an analytical framework for each of the three
fundamental problems and explain how they interact with one
another to create the body of space law that currently exists. Part III
will review H.R. 2617 and analyze the terms of the bill within the
context of the three fundamental problems. Part IV will provide
three possible models of Congressional action that could be used to
implement the bill in a modified form. The final section will propose
that the best course of action at this time would be to regulate the acts
of United States citizens and companies and pursue bilateral
negotiations with other space-faring nations to the benefit and
protection of the Apollo landing sites.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF SPACE LAW
Humankind's general understanding of its relationship with space
has been defined by stories about the Space Race, satellite
20communication, and knowledge gained from atmospheric sciences.
However, our legal relationship with space has been guided by a
series of restrictive laws that limited the use of space during the Cold
War, a turbulent era of international relations. 2 1 The primary source
of international space law is the Outer Space Treaty, developed in the
General Assembly of the United Nations in the early 1960's, ratified
at the height of the Space Race, and signed as an international accord
in 1967. 22 The principles of the Outer Space Treaty were later
19. See infra Section III.
20. See, e.g., Roger D. Launius, Public Opinion Polls and Perceptions of US
Human Spaceflight, 19 SPACE POLICY 163, 163-175 (2003); Mark E. Byrnes,
POLITICS AND SPACE: IMAGE MAKING BY NASA (1994).
21. See generally P.P.C. HAANAPPEL, THE LAW AND POLICY OF AIR SPACE AND
OUTER SPACE (2003); FRANCIS LYALL AND PAUL LARSON, SPACE LAW: A
TREATISE (2009); Ronald L. Spencer, Jr., State Supervision of Space Activity, 63
A.F. L. REV. 75 (2009).
22. The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,
G.A. Res. 2222 (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/RES/2222(XXI) (Jan. 21, 1967) [hereinafter
2015]
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elaborated in the 1979 Moon Agreement, but because the treaty was
23not widely adopted, its effect on international diplomacy is muted.
With the decline and fall of the Soviet Union and the rise of modern
telecommunications, space law began to develop as a practical
outgrowth of the problems facing businesses and governments whose
24satellites vie for the same orbits. Some of the most recent and
innovative changes in space law have occurred on the state level in
the United States, specifically with New Mexico's push to become
the home of the developing commercial market for space tourism.
2 5
But even with these developments there are significant problems that
are inherent to the international treaties developed in the 1960s and
the 1970s, and which cannot be easily overcome through local,
regional, or national legislation.
A. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty
Underwriting the past fifty years of legal precedent in space law is
the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which has defined the legal
Outer Space Treaty]; David Davies Memorial Institute, Draft Code of Rules on the
Exploration and Uses of Outer Space, 29 J. AIR L. AND COMM. 141, 141-50 (1963).
23. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies, G.A. Res. 34/68, U.N. Doc. AIRES/34/68 (Dec. 5, 1979)
[hereinafter Moon Agreement]. As of 2014 there are only fifteen nations that have
ratified the treaty, and four signatory nations, see Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space, Legal Subcomm., Status of International Agreements relating to
activities in outer space as at 1 January 2014, U.N. Doc.
A/AC. 105/C.2/2014/CRP.7 (Mar. 20, 2014), available at
http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/limited/c2/AC 105 C2 2014_CRP07E.pdf [hereinafter
Status of International Agreements], archived at http://perma.cc/D6ZP-LRS4.
24. Although there are a series of treaties about satellite use before the fall of
the Soviet Union, the character of satellite usage dramatically changed in the 1990s
and 2000s to one that is primarily dominated by private rather than government
interests. See generally Behrens, supra note 12.
25. See Regional Spaceport District Act, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 5-16-1; Space Flight
Informed Consent Act, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-14-1. Although it should be noted
that other states, including California, Alaska, Texas, Oklahoma, and Virginia,
have permitted and encouraged the creation of spaceports within their own state,
see Doug Messier, Spaceports, Spaceports, Everywhere a Spaceport (But Very
Little to Launch), PARABOLIC ARC (Feb. 12, 2013), http://www.parabolicarc.com/
2013 /02/12/spaceports-spaceports-everywhere-a-spaceport-but-very-little-to-
launch/, archived at http://perma.cc/7E5E-KT2Q.
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commitments of its signatories since beginning of the Cold War.2 6
The reason that the treaty was created has its roots in the Space Race
and the desire of both the United States and the Soviet Union to set
ground rules before the first man set foot on the Moon.27 Both the
United States and the Soviet Union feared that the other nation would
claim sovereignty over a celestial body such as the Moon, place
weapons there, and exclude the other from those same privileges by
virtue of being first. 2 8 For these and other reasons, the drafting
committees from both countries agreed to treaty language based on
their prior experiences with the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty29 and
the Antarctic Treaty.30
The parts of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty modeled after the
Antarctic Treaty are provisions used to limit the use and ownership
of the Antarctic continent to custodial and scientific uses. 3 1 The
features of the Antarctic Treaty that played a key role in the
development of the Outer Space Treaty emerge from the First
International Geophysical Year in 1957, when scientists all over the
26. See Lyall and Larson, supra note 21; Outer Space Treaty, supra note 22.
27. Ivan A. Vlasic, The Space Treaty: A Preliminary Evaluation, 55 CAL. L.
REv. 507, 507-508 (1967).
28. Id. at 512; Paul Dembling and Daniel Arons, The Evolution of the Outer
Space Treaty, 33 J. AIR L. & COM. 419, 420-421 (1967).
29. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space
and Under Water, Oct. 10, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, 480 U.N.T.S. 43, available at
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%/ 20480/v480.pdf, archived
at https://perma.cc/T5YS-E4A8. The creation of this treaty would not have
occurred without the pressured of the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, see Harold K.
Jacobson, The Test-Ban Negotiations: Implications for the Future, 351 THE
CHANGING COLD WAR 92, 96 (1964).
30. Vlasic, supra note 27, at 509-12; Dembling and Arons, supra note 28, at
422-24 (1967).
31. The Antarctic Treaty, art. III, Dec. 1, 1959, 12.1 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S.
71 [hereinafter The Antarctic Treaty]. The treaty is not universally recognized, and
there are seven nations that claim portions of the Antarctic continent as part of their
nation, see GEOFFREY W. G. LEANE AND BARBARA VON TIGERSTROM,
INTERNATIONAL LAW ISSUES IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC: POLICIES AND PRACTICES 200-
207 (2005); Adam G. Quinn, The New Age of Space Law: The Outer Space Treaty
and the Weaponization of Space, 17 MINN. J. INT'L L. 475 (2008); Margaret Race,
Policies for Scientific Exploration and Environmental Protection, in SCIENCE
DIPLOMACY: ANTARCTICA, SCIENCE AND THE GOVERNANCE OF INTERNATIONAL
SPACES 143-152 (S.D. Berkman et al. eds., 2011); Rip Bulkeley, The Political
Origins of the Antarctic Treaty, 46 POLAR REC. 9 (2010).
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world attempted to take a scientific 'picture' of the Earth. 3 2  In
particular, the Antarctic Treaty preserved the continent for scientific,
cooperative, and transnational efforts by legally seeking to prevent
the expansion of national interests (and the Cold War) to
Antarctica.33 The effects of the Antarctic Treaty on the Outer Space
Treaty can clearly be seen in the outcomes of government sponsored
expansion into space, which has been almost exclusively scientific,
cooperative, and transnational in nature.34
The most striking aspect of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty is the
language in Articles I and II, which borrows heavily from the ideals
of the Antarctic Treaty.35 Article I requires that all "exploration and
use of outer space... shall be carried out for the benefit and in the
interest of all countries.., and shall be the common province of all
mankind." 36 Article II similarly requires that "[o]uter space,
32. For an explanation of the role of geosciences in the Cold War, and the
International Geophysical Year as a notable exception to Cold War hostility, see
Ronald E. Doel, Constituting the Postwar Earth Sciences: The Military's Influence
on the Environmental Sciences in the USA after 1945, 33 Soc. STUDIES OF SCI.
635, 647-648 (2003).
33. The Antarctic Treaty, supra note 31, at art. III; see also id.; Vlasic, supra
note 27, at 507-08.
34. The clearest example would be the International Space Station, which has
been a transnational cooperative venture to fund scientific work in space. For the
types of scientific work created on the station, see Donald Pettit, Exploring the
Frontier: Science of Opportunity on the International Space Station, 153 PROC. OF
THE AM. PHIL. Soc'Y 381 (2009). For information about the creation of the
International Space Station, see Memorandum of Understanding between the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration of the United States of America
and the Russian Space Agency Concerning Cooperation on the Civil International
Space Station, U.S.-Russ., Jan. 29, 1998, 1998 U.S.T. 303, available at
http://www.nasa.gov/missionpages/station/structure/elements/nasa rsa.html,
archived at http://perma.cc/6BYZ-KZND. For the current status of the
International Space Station, see International Space Station, NASA,
http://www.nasa.gov/missionpages/station/main/index.html (last visited Feb. 9,
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/7EFF-BQP2.
35. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 22; The Antarctic Treaty, supra note 31, at
art. III; see also Christopher C. Joyner, Legal Implications of the Concept of the
Common Heritage of Mankind, 35 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 190, 190-99 (1986); Lyall
and Larson, supra note 21; Stephen Gorove, The Concept of Common Heritage of
Mankind: A Political Moral Or Legal Innovation?, 9 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 390
(1971-1972).
36. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 22.
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including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to
national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or
occupation, or by any other means., 37 The plain language of these
two sections delineate strong propositions that prevent the
exploitation and appropriation of space resources except in ways that
allow equal access to all mankind - which is not easily
accomplished. 38 These two sections are analogous to the Antarctic
Treaty's Articles III and IV, which grant the benefit of the scientific
use of Antarctica to all mankind39 and prevent any "new claim, or
enlargement of an existing claim, to territorial sovereignty in
Antarctica... while the present Treaty is in force."
40
While the language in Articles I and I prevented the machinations
of the Cold War from spreading to space, that same language now
serves to inhibit the burgeoning commercial uses of space and the
United States government's ability to protect important space
41resources like the Apollo landing sites. While there was some
enthusiasm for the language of the Outer Space Treaty at the time of
42its adoption by legal scholars, modern scholars have identified the
much-lauded language of Articles I and I as the source of present
concern and future problems.43 As one of the most widely adopted
treaties related to outer space,44 the 1967 Outer Space Treaty is both
foundational to international space law and should be a serious
concern for lawmakers wishing to legislate on matters related to outer
37. Id.
38. Joyner, supra note 35, at 190-99; see also Vlasic, supra note 27, at 508 n. 6
(The sentiment at the time of creating the Outer Space Treaty was that that any
commercial exploitation of space was so far in the future that the drafters of the
Treaty need not concern themselves with considering the effects of the language on
commercial interests).
39. The Antarctic Treaty, supra note 31, at art. III.
40. Id. at art. IV.
41. See generally Gorove, supra note 35; Outer Space Treaty, supra note 22.
42. See, e.g., Vlasic, supra note 27.
43. See generally Ricky J. Lee, Reconciling International Space Law with the
Commercial Realities of the Twenty-First Century, 4 SING. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
194, 234-42 (2000); Julie A. Jiru, Star Wars and Space Malls: When the Paint
Chips Off a Treaty's Golden Handcuffs, 42 S. TEX. L. REv. 155, 166-73 (2001).
44. To see the status of the treaties related to space worldwide, see Status of
International Agreements, supra note 23.
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space.45 But beyond just the Outer Space Treaty, there are other laws
that should be considered, including the 1979 Moon Agreement.46
B. The 1979 Moon Agreement
After the adoption of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, the General
Assembly of the United Nations considered and passed the 1979
Moon Agreement.47 The intended purpose of the Moon Agreement
was to build on the terms of the Outer Space Treaty and increase
protections for the Moon, our nearest celestial neighbor.4 8 The 1979
Moon Agreement sought to address concerns about the consequences
of resource extraction on the Moon, while also seeking to uphold and
expand the original, strong, language of the Outer Space Treaty.49
The Agreement specifically contemplated the consequences of
commercial uses of the Moon in light of the language in Articles I
and I of the Outer Space Treaty, expanding the limitations to
explicitly state that no entity or natural person may appropriate
property in a celestial body or resource through its use.5° Moreover,
45. Although the United States has not declared its acceptance of the right and
obligations pursuant to the treaty formally, it has ratified the treaty, see id.
46. See id.
47. Because of the high costs of diplomatic conferences to prepare treaties, the
United Nations has substituted General Assembly review of agency-proposed
drafts and treaties, see Moon Agreement, supra note 23; Lyall and Larson, supra
note 21.
48. See Lyall and Larson, supra note 21, at 56-7.
49. Moon Agreement, supra note 23; J.R. Wilson, Regulation of the Outer
Space Environment through International Accord: The 1979 Moon Treaty, 2
FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REP. 173, 173-94 (2011); J.L. Zell, Putting a Mine on the
Moon: Creating International Authority to Regulate Mining Rights in Outer Space,
15 MINN. J. INT. L. 489, 489-519 (2006); S. Doyle, Using Extraterrestrial
Resources under the Moon Agreement of 1979, 26 J. SP. L. 111, 111-28 (1996); A.
Dula, Free Enterprise and the Proposed Moon Treaty, 2 Hous. J. INT'L. L. 3, 33
(1972).
50. Moon Agreement, supra note 23, at art. 11(3) ("Neither the surface nor the
subsurface of the Moon, nor any part thereof or natural resources in place, shall
become property of any State, international intergovernmental or non-
governmental organization, national organization or nongovernmental entity or of
any natural person. The placement of personnel, space vehicles, equipment,
facilities, stations and installations on or below the surface of the Moon, including
structures connected with its surface or subsurface, shall not create a right of
ownership over the surface or the subsurface of the Moon or any areas thereof").
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the Moon Agreement maintained the prohibition against national
appropriation through "means of use or occupation, or by any other
means."
51
For reasons beyond the scope of this essay, the 1979 Moon
Agreement failed to enjoy wide adoption, and, as of the writing of
this essay, only seven nations have ratified the agreement - the
United States not being one of those nations. 52 However, even if the
United States is not legally obligated to follow the terms of the 1979
Moon Agreement, it would stand to generate international ill-will by
failing to adhere to the spirit of the agreement, which largely mirrors
the express terms of the Outer Space Treaty.53 However, even with
the limitations, the passage of H.R. 2617 or a similar bill is not
impossible. All that is required is for us to look at more recent
standards in international space law than the 1967 Outer Space
Treaty and 1979 Moon Agreement.
C. Modern Commercial Space Laws
International space law has developed together with the creation
and use of commercial satellites, along with the attendant problems
arising from their use.54 This trend can be seen in the development of
51. Id.
52. Status of International Agreements, supra note 23 (In fact, only Austria,
Chile, Morocco, the Netherlands, Peru, the Philippines, and Uruguay have ratified
the treaty to date; and only the Netherlands has space capability out of the nations
that are signatories).
53. For comparison between the treaty and the agreement, see generally Lyall
and Larson, supra note 21, at 179-83.
54. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-07-16, FAA NEEDS CONTINUED
PLANNING AND MONITORING TO OVERSEE THE SAFETY OF THE EMERGING SPACE
TOURISM INDUSTRY REPORTS 7-15 (2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/
products/GAO-07-16, archived at http://perma.cc/B5FL-VJUK; Philippa Maister,
SpaceWorks Engineering rides on rocket business, DAILY REP., Apr. 24, 2007,
http://www.dailyreportonline.com/id-1202552605046/ SpaceWorks-Engineering-
rides-on-rocket-business?slreturn-20150111002218, archived at http://perma.cc/
NH3Z-AJSX; Sonia E. Miller, An Attorney's Guide to Space Travel; Technology
Today, N.Y.L.J. September 18, 2007, http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id-
900005491245/An-Attorneys-Guide-to-Space-Travel?slreturn-20150111002359,
archived at http://perma.cc/K7BV-XPUS; Mary Dittmar, Commercial Avenues for
Space Utilization, in AIAA SPACE 2003 CONFERENCE AND EXPOSITION 6234
(2003), available at http://arc.aiaa.org/doi/abs/10.2514/6.2003-6234, archived at
http://perma.cc/S7B6-2PWN; M. Menter, Commercial Space Activities under the
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international norms through the United Nations, which have been
adhered-to in private agreements between non-government
organizations. 55 Satellites have been in use since the late 1950s, and
decades of experience with resolving disputes related to satellites has
allowed for the creation and modification of a robust set of
international agreements,56 including contract and dispute resolution
between private parties. 57 One of the key changes to international
norms has been the establishment of jurisdiction over satellites
launched from a particular nation, or owned by citizens and
companies of a particular nation.
58
Currently, there are proposed rules and regulations that would
expand the international commercial regime to encompass all
commercial activities in space, and not only those related to
Moon Treaty 7 SYRACUSE J. INT'L. L. & CoM., 213, 213-38 (1979); P.P.C.
Haanappel, A Competitive Environment in Outer Space, 32 J. SPACE L., 1, 1-14
(2006).
55. These treaties include the 1975 Convention on Registration of Objects
Launched into Outer Space, the 1974 Convention Relating to the Distribution of
Programme-Carrying Signals Transmitted by Satellite, the 1971 Agreement
Relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (ITSO),
the 1971 Agreement on the Establishment of the INTERSPUTNIK International
System and Organization of Space Communications, the 1976 Agreement of the
Arab Corporation for Space Communications (ARABSAT), the 1976 Convention
on the International Mobile Satellite Organization, the 1982 Convention
Establishing the European Telecommunications Satellite Organization
(EUTELSAT), the 1983 Convention for the Establishment of a European
Organization for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites (EUMETSAT), and
the 1992 International Telecommunication Constitution and Convention. See
Status of International Agreements, supra note 23.
56. An indication of this is the fact that old agreements have been amended and
updated. See id.
57. See Setsuko Aoki, Current Status and Recent Developments in Japan's
National Space Law and Its Relevance to Pacific Rim Space Law and Activities, 35
J. SPACE L., 363, 368-70 (2009); Meghan R. Plantz, Orbital Debris: Out of Space,
40 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L., 585, 613-18 (2011); see generally Gerardine Meishan
Goh, Softly, Softly Catchee Monkey: Informalism and the Quiet Development of
International Space Law, 87 NEB. L. REV. 725 (2008). For a discussion of how
our collective experiences with commercial satellites can prepare us for tourism,
see Steven Freeland, Up, up and ... Back: The Emergence of Space Tourism and Its
Impact on the International Law of Outer Space, 6 CHI. J. INT'L L., 1, 6-11 (2005).
58. Although these norms have their own problems. See, e.g., Lee, supra note
43, at 229-33.
[VOL. XXVI
FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LA W RE VIE W
commercial satellites.5 9 However, some of the proposals conflict
with the foundations of international space law as outlined in the
Outer Space Treaty and the Moon Agreement.60 The proposals seek
to change some of the most restrictive terms of the Outer Space
Treaty and Moon Agreement while simultaneously holding open the
door to outer space for all humankind. This trend can be seen in
some of the laws proposed and passed within the United States, both
on the federal and state levels.61
D. Space Law of the United States
Within the United States, the federal government has ventured into
more robust forms of legislation and regulation for commercial space
activities and has recently chosen to treat space law as a unique area
62
of law separate from the other sections of the United States Code.
59. Charity Trelease Ryabinkin, Let There Be Flight: It's Time to Reform the
Regulation of Commercial Space Travel, 69 J. AIR L. & CoM., 101, 130-37 (2004);
Jinyuan Su and Zhu Lixin, The European Union Draft Code of Conduct for Outer
Space Activities: An appraisal Space Policy, 30 SPACE POL'Y, 34, 34-39; John S.
Lewis and Christopher F. Lewis, A Proposed International Legal Regime for the
Era of Private Commercial Utilization of Space, 37 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV.,
745, 745-67 (2005); Zach Meyer, Private Commercialization of Space in an
International Regime: A Proposal for a Space District, 30 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus.
241, 258-61 (2010); Byron C. Brittingham, Does the World Really Need New
Space Law? (January 2010) (unpublished article) (on file with Expresso as part of
the Selected Works of Byron Brittingham), available at
http://works.bepress.com/bryon brittingham/l/, archived at http://perma.cc/72HS-
KZ9S.
60. Indeed, the solutions proposed amount to exhortations for private parties to
ignore the Outer Space Treaty in its entirety, see, e.g., Salter and Leeson, supra
note 15, at 583-84; C.R. Buxton, Property in Outer Space: The Common Heritage
of Mankind Principle vs. the First in Time, First in Right Rule of Property, 69 J.
AIR L. AND COMM. 689, 702-05(2004).
61. In particular within New Mexico, see infra Section I(D).
62. See NATHAN C. GOLDMAN, AMERICAN SPACE LAW: INTERNATIONAL AND
DOMESTIC (1996); U.S. DEP'T OF COMM., NAT'L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC
ADMIN., U.S. LEADERSHIP IN SPACE COMMERCE: OFFICE OF SPACE
COMMERCIALIZATION 2007 STRATEGIC PLAN (2007), available at
http://www.space.commerce.gov/wp-content/uploads/NOAA-2007-Space-
Commercialization-Strategic-Plan-6-pages.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/F96N-
FHRD; Will Tress, Lost Laws: What We Can't Find in the United States Code, 40
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV., 129, 138 (2009). For a brief description of U.S. Federal
space law up until 2012, see Benjamin Perlman, Grounding U.S. Commercial
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The main step in this process has been to reorganize the United States
Code to include a new Title dedicated to space law - Title 5 1.63 Title
51 includes the authorization for NASA, funding for space-related
programs, as well as authorization and funding for an agency known
as the Office of Space Commercialization. 64 The official
reorganization of the United States Code marks a sea change towards
greater recognition and expansion of commercial activities in space,
and their regulation by the United States federal government.
But while the federal government has taken some steps in the
direction of regulating commercial activities in space, the state of
New Mexico has sought to establish and promote space-based
industries within its borders through far more aggressive legislative
means. 65 There have been two rounds of legislative action within the
state that display the commitment of New Mexico's government to
the use of New Mexico as a site for commercial space activities. The
first round saw the creation of a regional spaceport district, which
was a successful initiative to draw the space tourism industry into the
Space Regulation in the Constitution, 100 GEO. L.J. 929, 934-37 (2011); see also
Surya Gablin Gunasekara, Other Transaction Authority: NASA's Dynamic
Acquisition Instrument for the Commercialization of Manned Spaceflight or Cold
War Relic, 40 PUB. CONT. L.J. 893, 895-98 (2010) (Describing NASA's ability to
act independently of Congressional direction regarding certain transactions).
63. H.R. 3237, 11 1th Cong. (2009) (enacted).
64. 51 U.S.C. §§ 10101 et seq. (2012) (for the general terms of the Title); 51
U.S.C. §§ 50701 et seq. (2012) (Regarding the Office of Space
Commercialization).
65. Michael Tse, One Giant Leap [Backwards] for Mankind, 79 BROOK. L.
REv. 291, 291-320 (2013); Michael C. Mineiro, Law and Regulation Governing
U.S. Commercial Spaceports: Licensing, Liability, and Legal Challenges, 73 J. AIR
L. & CoM. 759, 792-93 (2008); Thomas Brannen, Private Commercial Space
Transportation's Dependence on Space Tourism and NASA's Responsibility to
Both, 75 J. AIR L. & CoM. 639, 656-59 (2010); Zhao Yun, A Legal Regime for
Space Tourism: Creating Legal Certainty in Outer Space, 74 J. AIR L. & COM. 959,
962-64 (2009); Regional Spaceport District Act, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 5-16-1 to § 5-
16-13 (2006); Space Flight Informed Consent Act, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-14-1 to §
41-14-4 (2006).
Although the trend in New Mexico of supporting the commercial space
industry may be reversing, see Mike English, With no launch in sight, NM
legislator wants to sell Spaceport, BUSINESS JOURNALS, Jan. 30, 2015,
http://www.bizjournals.com/albuquerque/blog/morning-edition!2015/01/with-no-
launch-in-sight-nm-legislator-wants-to.html, archived at http://perma.ccV8EG-
384G.
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state by making it possible for that industry to operate according to
clearly established rules.66 The second round of legislative action
came more recently, and seeks to protect the growth of the burdening
space tourism industry in New Mexico by shielding businesses from
67liability from certain negligent acts. The effects of these actions on
international law has been negligible, but the fact that all of the laws
passed by New Mexico fall well within the explicit terms of the
Outer Space Treaty show that it is possible for a government to take
decisive steps to both promote and regulate their commercial space
industry without violating the terms or spirit of the Outer Space
Treaty and Moon Agreement.
However, even New Mexico's foray into lawmaking, no matter
how aggressive or innovative, is not the area of space law showing
the greatest growth in the last few decades: that honor lies with the
68
academe. In the last couple of decades there have been numerous
proposals, ideas, and articles written about the present state of space
69law and its future needs. In part, this has been due to the changed
makeup of who is going into outer space where an increasing number
of responsibilities and opportunities have fallen into the hands of
private and commercial interests rather than remaining with
governments. 70 This has also been due to the failure of outer space
law to develop and change as quickly or as thoroughly as academics
expect, predict, and desire.7 1 Primarily, this has been due to the three
72fundamental problems in space law remaining unresolved.
66. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 5-16-1-13 (2006).
67. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-14-4 (2006) (Providing that "a space flight entity
is not liable for injury to or death of a participant resulting from the inherent risks
of space flight activities so long as the warning contained in Section 41-14-4
NMSA 1978 is distributed and signed as required").
68. See, e.g., M.S. Smirnoff, The Role of the JAF in the Elaboration of the
Norms of Future Space Law, 2 PROC. IISL 151 (1959); MANFRED LACHS, THE LAW
OF OUTER SPACE: AN EXPERIENCE IN CONTEMPORARY LAW-MAKING (2010); Zhao
Yun, Revisiting Selected Issues in the Draft Protocol to the Cape Town Convention
on Matters Specific to Space Assets, 76 J. AIR L. & COM. 805 (2011).
69. See, e.g., supra note 15; infra note 131.
70. See Behrens, supra note 12, at 8; supra note 14; see also, supra note 8.
71. See generally supra note 15.
72. See generally Jiru, supra note 43.
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E. The Failure to Address the
Three Fundamental Problems in Space Law
A persistent theme in papers and books published in the last
several decades has been an identification of the failure of laws and
treaties to provide incentives for commercial space activities.73 Some
scholars have argued that Articles I and II of the Outer Space Treaty
impede the development of the commercial space industry, and of
human access to space generally, by removing economic incentives
for businesses to spend the money needed to access space.74 They
argue that no business wants to invest money developing a habitat on
the Moon or mining operation on an asteroid with the prospect that
Article I of the Outer Space Treaty means that any profit they receive
must be apportioned out to "all mankind., 75 An analysis of these
currently theoretical questions reveals that three distinct problems
emerge from the academic literature: the three fundamental problems
of property, sovereignty, and jurisdiction.
The failure of space law to adequately address real property rights,
the status of sovereign nations in space, and the ability of nations to
extend their legal jurisdiction into space has posed significant
73. See generally Graham Nicholson, The Common Heritage of Mankind and
Mining: An Analysis of the Law as to the High Seas, Outer Space, the Antarctic
and World Heritage, 6 N.Z. J. ENVTL. L. 177 (2002); Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz,
One Half Century and Counting: The Evolution of U.S. National Space Law and
Three Long-Term Emerging Issues, 4 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 405 (2010); Jennifer
Frakes, The Common Heritage of Mankind Principle and Deep Seabed, Outer
Space, and Antarctica: Will Developed and Developing Nations Reach a
Compromise, 21 WIS. INT'L L.J. 409 (2003); Blake Gilson, Defending Your
Client's Property Rights in Space: A Practical Guide for the Lunar Litigator, 80
FORDHAM L. REV. 1367 (2011); S. G. Sreejith, Uhither International Law, Thither
Space Law: A Discipline in Transition, 38 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 331 (2007); Tanja
Masson-Zwaan and Steven Freeland, Between heaven and earth: The legal
challenges of human space travel, 66 ACTA ASTRONAUTICA 1597, 1597-1607
(2010).
74. See, e.g., Ty S. Twibell, Space Law: Legal Restraints on Commercialization
and Development of Outer Space, 65 UMKC L. REv., 589, 610-619 (1996)
(Focusing on the detrimental effects of Article II, but covering the consequences of
all the relevant Articles of the Outer Space Treaty throughout the essay).
75. Id. Or, indeed, to anyone other than themselves and their investors.
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problems for commercial interests.76 Those same limitations have
made H.R. 2617, a relatively straightforward bill to protect the
Apollo landing sites, legally complex. But while the legal framework
created by the Outer Space Treaty makes straightforward ownership
difficult, it may still allow for some sovereign and jurisdictional
interest in the Apollo landing sites.
77
II. THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS OF
PROPERTY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND JURISDICTION
The three fundamental problems in space law come from the
language in Articles I, II, and VIII of the Outer Space Treaty, which
explicitly prohibit the extension of property ownership, sovereignty,
and legal jurisdiction over celestial objects. 78 Because manmade
objects launched into space are not defined as celestial objects, these
restrictions have not posed a significant obstacle to the development
of satellite technology, 79 or the creation of the ISS. 8° On account of
their earthly origins, those craft fall under the full possession,
sovereignty, and legal jurisdiction of the countries involved in their
manufacture, ownership, or launch. 81 This exception to the terms of
the Outer Space Treaty would not apply to any plan to establish a
permanent legal presence on a celestial body, as H.R. 2617
contemplates.
82
76. See, e.g., id. at 610-19; Nicholson, supra note 73, at 190; Gabrynowicz,
supra note 73, at 420-25; Frakes, supra note 73, at 410-15; Gilson, supra note 73,
at 1388-94; see generally Sreejith, supra note 73; Masson-Zwaan and Freeland,
supra note 73.
77. See infra note 110.
78. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 22; see also Stephen Gorove, Interpreting
Article II of the Outer Space Treaty, 37 FORDHAM L. REV. 349 (1968-1969);
Landry, supra note 15; Salter and Leeson, supra note 15; Thomas R. Adams, The
Outer Space Treaty: An Interpretation in Light of the No-Sovereignty Provision, 9
HARV. INT'L. L. J. 140 (1968); Zullo, supra note 15.
79. See supra Section I(C).
80. See infra Section II(A).
81. See Lee, supra note 43, at 229-33. This stands in contrast to any attempt at
transforming or appropriating resources from outer space, which would be
prohibited under the treaty, see Gorove, supra note 78.
82. H.R. 2617, supra note 1.
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The conceptual basis to the practical restrictions outlined in the
Outer Space Treaty is the idea that the Moon and all other celestial
bodies are part of the common heritage of mankind. 83 While there is
no single or clear definition of what it means for something to be the
common heritage of mankind, the concept embraces the idea that
there are some types of property that belong to all people in common,
rather than just to those people with the ability to immediately exploit
84
or appropriate them. Proposing, however, that the normal rights to
property, the rule of law, and the relationship between a government
and its people do not apply in space has caused confusion and
paralysis in legal action that would address property rights, national
jurisdiction, and national sovereignty in space. 85
A. Property
The first and most restrictive implication of the common heritage
doctrine for the development and regulation of space-based
commercial activities lies in its restrictions on the acquisition and
development of real property in space. 86 While there are some
provisions in the Outer Space Treaty and other international
agreements that allow for a property interest in vehicles, satellites,
and other manmade objects in space, there is no clear indication of
whether transformation of space resources into such objects would
83. The origin of these limitations was recognized early on. See 0. Schachter,
Who Owns the Universe? COLLIERS WKLY., Mar. 1952, 36, 70-1; ACROSS THE
SPACE FRONTIER 118 (C. Ryan, ed., 1952); Schachter, supra note 15. And
continues to be recognized by modem scholars, see JULIAN HERMIDA, LEGAL BASIS
FOR A NATIONAL SPACE LEGISLATION (2004); Listner, supra note 15; E.J.
Reinstein, Owning Outer Space, 20 Nw. J. INT. L. & Bus. 59, 59-98 (1999).
84. For an attempt at a working definition of what the common heritage of
mankind means, see Frakes, supra note 73, at 411-13. In addition it should be
noted that there are many other means to understand property rights, see generally
Rosa Congost, Property Rights and Historical Analysis: What Rights? What
History?, 181 PAST & PRESENT 73 (2003).
85. Indeed, paralysis of economic activity that typically follows alongside
confused market actors, see Fountain, supra note 15, at 1754.
86. Job Abraham, Concept ofPrivate Property in Space - An Analysis; Cherian,
Jijo George, 2 J. INT'L COM. L. & TECH. 211 (2007); Malay Adhikari, Space
Tourism-Legal Issues and Challenges with Special Reference to India, 1 NULD
CURRENT DEV. IN AIR AND SPACE L. 385 (2012).
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87
confer ownership rights. There has also been debate about whether
the Outer Space Treaty only bans direct ownership of land or whether
it prohibits the ownership of resources extracted from outer space;
this lack of clarity is a cause for concern among legal scholars. 88 The
ultimate result of the common heritage language in the Outer Space
Treaty has been to effectively prohibit the ownership of any naturally
occurring object in outer space: which means that no company,
country, or individual" can legitimately claim ownership of outer
space real estate. 9° The lack of clarity on this issue also poses a
significant question for the creation H.R. 2617's Apollo Lunar
Landing Sites National Park.
The most recognized way scholars have asked the questions raised
in H.R. 2617 has been to ask "who owns the Moon?" 91 In the case of
H.R. 2617 this is a practical question, but it is more often posed as a
rhetorical device to explore the contours of real estate law in outer
92space. The problem of real property ownership in space is one that
has been understood since the adoption of the Outer Space Treaty
and has received elaboration by scholars over the years as more of
87. Henry R. Hertzfeld and Frans G. von der Dunk, Bringing Space Law into
the Commercial World: Property Rights without Sovereignty 6 CHI. J. INT'L L. 81,
81-84 (2005-2006); David Johnson, Limits on the Giant Leap for Mankind: Legal
Ambiguities of Extraterrestrial Resource Extraction 26 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1477,
1510-1513 (2010-2011).
88. Rosanna Sattler, Transporting a Legal System for Property Rights: from the
Earth to the Stars, 6 CHI. J. INT'L L. 23, 28-29 (2005-2006).
89. Gregor William, Nemitz v. The United States of America et al., no. CV-N-
0300599 HDM-RAM (D. Nev. filed Nov. 6, 2003); R. Kelly, Nemitz v United
States, A Case of First Impression: Appropriation, Private Property Rights and
Space Law before the Federal Courts of the United States, 30 J. SP. L. 297, 297-
309 (2004).
90. Sarah Coffey, Establishing a Legal Framework for Property Rights to
Natural Resources in Outer Space, 41 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 119, 120-121
(2009) ; H.R. 2617, supra note 1.
91. See, e.g., J.C. Cooper, Who Will Own the Moon? The Need for an Answer,
UNIVERSITY: A PRINCETON QUARTERLY, Winter 1966; V. PoP, UNREAL ESTATE:
THE MEN WHO SOLD THE MOON (2006); V. Pop, The Men who Sold the Moon:
Science Fiction or Legal Nonsense?, 17 SPACE POL'Y 195, 195-203 (2001).
92. H.R. 2617, supra note 1; Lyall and Larson, supra note 21, at 175-97.
2015]
536 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LA W RE VIE W
them have come to recognize the inevitability of commercial space
travel.93
The common heritage doctrine at the heart of the Outer Space
Treaty is understood in light of Article II, which includes a clause
prohibiting private or national appropriation of outer space or
celestial bodies. 94 In light of the no-appropriation clause, scholars
have recognized the problem between wanting to exploit the Moon in
ways requiring real property ownership, and not being able to get
past the planning phase because of the Outer Space Treaty.95 One
method used by governments to mitigate the problems of property
ownership posed by the Outer Space Treaty has been to differentiate
natural objects from man-made objects. An example of this strategy
can be seen in the ownership of the ISS.96 Each country owns
different pieces of the ISS but no country owns the entire station.97
This means that the station's parts remain under the ownership,
sovereignty, and jurisdiction of the country that created them.
The fact that the ISS was built in space holds some implications for
the non-appropriation clause even though the creation of ownership
rights on the station is a result of politics and not treaty obligations."
Because the ISS is an object residing in space, built in space, owned
by multiple governments on Earth, but which no single nation wholly
owns, it effectively precludes any one nation from violating the 'no-
93. For early recognition of the problems posed by the Outer Space Treaty, see
Cooper, supra note 91. For more recent sources, see Pop, supra note 91; Ryan
Hugh O'Donnell, Staking a Claim in the Twenty-First Century: Real Property
Rights on Extra- Terrestrial Bodies, 32 U. DAYTON L. REV. 461 (2006-2007).
94. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 22, at art. II; Status of International
Agreements, supra note 23.
95. Charles Geisler, Ownership in Stateless Places, in CHANGING PROPERTIES
OF PROPERTY 40-57 (Franz von Benda-Beckmann et al. eds., 2006); O'Donnell,
supra note 93.
96. Rochus Moenter, The International Space Station: Legal Framework and
Current Status, 64 J. AIR L. & CoM. 1033 (1998-1999); David C. Stewart,
Resolution of Legal Issues Confronting the International Space Station Project: A
Step Forward in the Development of Space Law, 29 VA. J. INT'L L. 745 (1988-
1989).
97. Id.
98. Recalling the language in Article II of the Treaty prohibiting national
appropriation of outer space itself - this arguably has occurred through the creation
of a permanent space station, see Status of International Agreements, supra note
23.
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appropriation' clause of the Outer Space Treaty, and similarly
precludes any one government from appropriating ownership interest
in outer space through the ISS.
Recognition of private property interests for man-made objects has
also occurred in a private, commercial setting for satellites. 99 The
common heritage doctrine would seem to require that all satellites
operate for the good of humankind, as not for-profit objects, but the
proliferation of paid satellite services and international recognition of
their private ownership and profit does violence to the Outer Space
Treaty. 100 If seen in the light of the Space Station Agreement, then
the Outer Space Treaty can be interpreted to allow for-profit use of
outer space only if the objects profited from were made and launched
from Earth. This interpretation of the treaty is based on the fact that
satellites are made of Earth resources, on Earth, and subject to Earth-
based rules, regulations, and ownership rights. That those satellites
are subsequently thrown into space do not interfere with established
property rights. But while this is a workaround to the problems
posed by the common heritage doctrine and the non-appropriation
clause, it offers no resolution for the inability to establish property
rights to real estate in space.
B. Sovereignty
More than just prohibiting the creation of property interest in
celestial objects, the Outer Space Treaty also prohibits the extension
99. K.A. Baca, Property Rights in Outer Space, 58 J. AIR L. AND COMM. 1041,
1085 (1993); M.J. Listner, The Challenges of Current Claims, 1 REGENT J. INT. L.
75, 75-94 (2003); Zullo, supra note 15 at 2413-44; Davin Widgerow, Boldly Going
Where No Realtor Has Gone Before: The Law of Outer Space and a Proposalfor a
New Interplanetary Property Law System, 28 WIS. INT'L L.J. 490 (2010-2011); W.
Whyte, Nemitz v US - the First Real Property Case in the United States Courts, 47
PROC. INT'L INST. OF SPACE L. 339, 339-51 (2004); P.M. Stems and L.I. Tennen,
Privateering and Profiteering on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies: Debunking
the Myth of Property Rights in Outer Space, 45 PROC. INT'L INST. OF SPACE L. 56,
56- 67 (2002).
100. Although scholars do not have a particularly clear or uniform understanding
of what the common heritage of mankind doctrine means, it seems unlikely to
provide for the private use and profit of businesses. See, e.g., Fountain, supra note
15; Joyner, supra note 35, at 190-99; Gorove, supra note 35, at 392, 398.
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of state sovereignty to celestial objects. 10 1 The practical effect of this
prohibition is to ban the existence of a country as a legal entity in
outer space, limiting the existence of countries to Earth. 102 To give
an analogy, if we were to compare the Earth to territorial waters of an
ocean and outer space to international waters, then the Outer Space
Treaty prohibits the existence of any countries on islands within
international waters. Were citizens of a nation to travel to an island
on international waters, never to return, then their nation would not
be able to 'follow' them to that island, and nothing they do on that
island - from destroy it to establish a city - could be attributed to their
home nation. Moreover, if those residents of the island desired to
form their own sovereign nation, the terms of the Outer Space Treaty
would prohibit signatory nations from recognizing it as a sovereign.
And while the idea of sovereign existence comingles with property
and jurisdiction, it should be noted that the prohibition of sovereign
status serves a different purpose in the Outer Space Treaty than the
prohibition on real property ownership and jurisdiction.10 3
The purpose behind this prohibition was to prevent the creation of
sovereign claims to lands and objects that no state should, or
reasonably could, own.10 4 At the dawn of the Space Age, with the
Cold War and Space Race in full swing, the last thing the United
Nations wanted was for the United States or the Soviet Union to plant
its flag on the Moon as a symbol of a sovereign claim to the entirety
of the Moon. 10 5 The intention was to prevent the arms race from
spreading to space, and prevent the Cold War from turning hot on the
basis of sovereign claims to celestial lands. 10 6 In this context, the
101. See Status of International Agreements, supra note 23; see also Adams,
supra note 79; C.W. Jenks, International Law and Activities in Space, 5 INT. LAW
QUART. 99 (1956).
102. Although the purpose and effect has been as such, this has not limited
practical application of sovereignty in outer space. See infra Section II(B); E.
Husby, Sovereignty and Property Rights in Outer Space, 3 J. INT. L. & PRACT. 359
(1994).
103. See infra note 113.
104. At the time of the passage of the Outer Space Treaty, anyway. See Adams,
supra note 78 ("Claims of sovereignty over celestial bodies probable could not be
made for some time since effective control cannot yet be established").
105. Supra, note 27, at 513-15.
106. See, e.g., id.; Adams, supra note 78.
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Outer Space Treaty achieved its goals, 10 7 but the failure of the United
Nations to elaborate conditions under which sovereignty could
legitimately be established has been noted as one of the reasons for
the slow growth of space industries other than satellites. 1l8
Even though the goals of the Outer Space Treaty were
accomplished, the treaty has failed to achieve its explicitly stated
ends: there has been an extension of national sovereignty into space
in spite of its explicit prohibition.10 9 The treaty establishing the ISS
skirts the terms of the Outer Space Treaty by extending national
sovereignty to the portions of the ISS owned by each government. 10
Under the Space Station Agreement, each section of the ISS is under
the control and jurisdiction of the nation that built it, which is
107. Evidenced by the fact that the Cold War did not result in space
militarization, or national claims of ownership over the Moon.
108. Compare Hertzfeld, supra note 87 ("Sovereignty, therefore, is not the
issue... Profits are the issue, and unless and until a way of assuring private
enterprises that their investments in research and development, equipment, and
operations in space can be recovered, the insecurity and risks of not having an
operating mechanism for establishing these rights will ompeade the fast growth of
commercial space"); with Adhikari, supra note 86 (Arguing the need for a national
space policy to address the lack of sovereignty of India in outer space); and Husby,
supra note 102.
109. See e.g. Husby, supra note 102 (Arguing that there has been an expansion
of national sovereignty in outer space). Compared to even the more recently stated
ends of US sovereignty in space, which hold fast to the ideals of the Outer Space
Treaty, see PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA, NATIONAL SPACE POLICY OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 3 (2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
default/files/national spacepolicy_6-28-10.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/
8WF8-QGAP; PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH, UNITED STATES NATIONAL SPACE
POLICY 1 (2006), available at https://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/space.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/BF6K-ACZA; PRESIDENT WILLIAM CLINTON, THE
WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COUNCIL: FACT SHEET
NATIONAL SPACE POLICY 1 (1996), available at http://history.nasa.gov/appf2.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/47Z8-D4NP.
110. Compare Mary B. McCord, Responding to the Space Station Agreement:
The Extension of U.S. Law into Space, 77 GEO. L. J. 1933, 1939-1942 (1988-89)
(Arguing that the extension of jurisdiction in the Space Station Agreement is
functionally the functional equivalent of extending sovereignty to outer space);
with Moenter, supra note 96 (Arguing that the Space Station Agreement does not
violate the sovereignty provision of the Outer Space Treaty because extensions of
national jurisdiction to craft like the International Space Station are contemplated
in Article VIII of the treaty).
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complicated by a series of overlapping national criminal and civil
jurisdictions to the same sections of the ISS.111 Even the purely
mechanical parts of the ISS owned by other governments have
extended national sovereignty of those nations with ownership of
those parts.' 12 The Space Station Agreement uses two methods to
justify the extension of sovereign power to outer space: the first to is
to rename their extension of sovereignty as a legitimate extension of
jurisdiction under the Outer Space Treaty, and the second is to treat
objects made on Earth and assembled in space as the same as any
other craft, despite indications that treaty may not allow such an
interpretation.113 Maintaining a permanent space station with a fixed,
if confusing, extension of national sovereignty may violate Article II
of the Outer Space Treaty, which prohibits national appropriation of
"outer space" through means of occupation, which has occurred here
due to the permanence of the ISS.
Looking at the legal treatment of both property and sovereignty
over the course of the last several decades, it is clear that provisions
of the Outer Space Treaty are being selectively interpreted and
ignored to allow for the continued development and use of space.
1 14
The reason for this is obvious: the Outer Space Treaty no longer
reflects a valid interpretation of how outer space should be managed
in a world that increasingly relies on outer space for commerce.
Nonetheless, the Outer Space Treaty is a valid and duly agreed-to
treaty, and, as signatories to the treaty, the United States has a
responsibility to adhere to its terms until such a time when it is
111. Stewart, supra note 96, at 753-61.
112. Agreement Concerning Cooperation on the International Space Station art.
5, Jan. 29, 1998, T.I.A.S. No. 12927 [hereinafter ISS Agreement], available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/107683.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/UM8H-CK3G; see also Stewart, supra note 96, at 753-54 ("Article
5 of the agreement provides that 'each nation shall retain jurisdiction and control
over the elements it registers').
113. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 22.
114. For a recent example see Andrew Tingkang, These Aren't the Asteroids You
Are Looking For: Classifying Asteroids in Space as Chattels, Not Land, 35
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 559, 579-587 (2011-2012) (Arguing that asteroids may be
interpreted under the Outer Space Treaty as chattel property rather than real
property, allowing for private appropriation); see also Frakes, supra note 73, 433-
34; Husby, supra note 102, at 372; McCord, supra note 110, at 1957.
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amended, repealed, or superseded. 115  This is true for all of our
obligations under the treaty regarding property, sovereignty, and
jurisdiction.
C. Jurisdiction
The result of prohibiting both real property ownership and the
extension of national sovereignty into outer space is that nations are
not allowed to extend their legal jurisdiction into space. 116 The sole
explicit exception to this rule is in Article VIII of the Outer Space
Treaty, allowing governments to retain jurisdiction over registered
objects and people sent to space. 117 Other than this narrow
exception, Article II of the treaty issues a blanket prohibition to any
form of "national appropriation" including an extension of legal
jurisdiction to space or a celestial body. 118 The effect of these terms
of the Outer Space Treaty is that governments and businesses are
able to build and use satellites, create the ISS, and conduct scientific
activities under Article VIII of the treaty. Everything else is
prohibited. 119
The prohibition against extending national jurisdiction into outer
space has unraveled over the last several decades as the necessities of
the commercial use of space have demanded mechanisms for dispute
resolution. 120 When only governments had the ability to place
115. Which has not occurred in such a way that allows the extension of sovereign
power into outer space, see Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Legal
Subcomm., Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Fifty-
seventh session, U.N. Doc. A/69/20 (Jun. 11-20, 2014), available at
http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/gadocs/A 69 20E.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/
5DLB-6SE5.
116. For a more thorough examination of what nations may extend their
jurisdiction over pursuant to the Outer Space Treaty, and the problems the treaty
encounters, see P.J. Blount, Jurisdiction in Outer Space: Challenges of Private
Individuals in Space, 33 J. SPACE L. 299 (2007); Marc M. Harrold, Asylum-Seekers
in Outer Space, a Perspective on the Intersection between International Space Law
and U.S. Immigration Law, 32 J. SPACE L. 15 (2006); Masson-Zwaan and Freeland,
supra note 73, at 1597-1607; Adhikari, supra note 86, at 385-98.
117. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 22.
118. Id.
119. And, as discussed above, even these activities run afoul some of the other
terms of the Outer Space Treaty, see supra Sections 11(A) and (B).
120. See Lyall and Larson, supra note 21, at 380-85.
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objects into space there was little need to worry about what would
occur if and when private industry sought to profit from outer
space. 121 However, when private businesses began to have the ability
to reach space, new treaties were enacted requiring those companies
register, effectively bringing them under the purview of the Outer
Space Treaty. With the modem advent of space tourism and other
forms of space commercialization, Articles II and VIII have become
out of date with what is necessary to administer a space-based sector
of the economy.123
To date, the clearest precedent for extending national jurisdiction
into space has been the Space Station Agreement. 124 The primary
innovations of the Space Station Agreement regarding jurisdiction
were discussed in the previous sections. 125 Its importance to this
section lies in the bilateral recognition of national jurisdiction in
outer space through the Space Station Agreement. This recognition
offers insight into the trend towards disregarding the terms of the
Outer Space Treaty that interfere with human access to space.126
The trend can also be seen in private, commercial, agreements.
Such agreements require that the jurisdiction of a particular sovereign
apply automatically to objects created or launched from that
sovereign's territory, or that private dispute resolution systems are in
121. See Blount, supra note 116, at 301 (Eloquently stating that "the laws of the
early days of space exploration were sufficient to precede States into space, but
now new laws must be developed in order to precede the growing private sector
into space").
122. Id.
123. What happens when there is a tort in space, or a crime like murder, or a
dispute over tourist routes? The Outer Space Treaty does not offer any answers,
especially if they occur in places where there is no sovereign jurisdiction, like a
permanent, privately-owned space station, or spaceship launched from international
waters see Blount, supra note 116, at 306-19 (2007) (Discussing jurisdiction over
crimes in outer space).
124. Although others include the extension of jurisdiction of satellite orbits to
several international agencies, which fall in a grey area in regards to the Outer
Space Treaty, see generally Lyall and Larson, supra note 21, at 319-87.
125. See supra Section II(B); see also ISS Agreement, supra note 112; Hans P.
Sinha, Criminal Jurisdiction on the International Space Station, 30 J. SPACE L. 85
(2004); McCord, supra note 110; Moenter, supra note 96; Stewart, supra note 96.
126. See supra Section II(B).
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place prior to launch. 127 The registration requirements listed in
Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty encompass many of the
current requirements, but there are other jurisdictional issues for
private launches that the treaty does not contemplate. 128 Some of
those issues have been considered in detail through international
agreements and contracts, 129 but there are still numerous problems
that may pose significant questions about jurisdiction.1 30
D. Proposed Changes
While there are any number of possible approaches to resolve the
three fundamental problems in outer space law, a significant number
of scholars agree that the Outer Space Treaty needs to be amended,
repealed, or superseded in order to create a legal system that
incentivizes both commercial activity and the safe use of space.131
127. Compare Protocol to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile
Equipment on Matters Specific to Space Assets, Mar. 9, 2012, available at
http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/mobile-equipment/spaceassets-
protocol-e.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/XN3R-SDYX; with Lyall and Larson,
supra note 21, at 319-87.
128. Zhao Yun, Revisiting the 1975 Registration Convention: Time for Revision,
11 AUSTL. INT'L L.J. 106, 111-113 (2004).
129. See Lyall and Larson, supra note 21, at 319-87.
130. Supra note 128.
131. Although not an exhaustive list, all of the following articles propose some
new system to replace the current treaties, see, e.g., Widgerow, supra note 99;
David Collins, Efficient Allocation of Real Property Rights on the Planet Mars, 14
B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 201 (2008); John Adolph, The Recent Boom in Private
Space Development and the Necessity of an International Framework Embracing
Private Property Rights to Encourage Investment, 40 INT'L LAW. 961 (2006);
Jonathan Thomas, Privatization of Space Ventures: Proposing a Proven Regulatory
Theory for Future Extraterrestrial Appropriation, 1 INT'L L. & MGMT. REV. 191
(2005); Gruner, A New Hope for International Space Law: Incorporating
Nineteenth Century First Possession Principles into the 1967 Space Treaty for the
Colonization of Outer Space in the Twenty-First Century, 35 SETON HALL L. REV.
299 (2004-2005); Buxton, surpa note 60, at 689-707 (2004); Nina Tannenwald,
Law versus Power on the High Frontier: The Case for a Rule-Based Regime for
Outer Space, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 363 (2004); Lawrence L. Risely, An Examination
of the Need to Amend Space Law to Protect the Private Explorer in Outer Space,
26 WEST. ST. UNIV. L. REV. 47, 47-70 (1999); R.P. Merges and G.H. Reynolds,
Space Resources, Common Property and the Collective Action Problem, 6 N.Y. U.
ENV. L.J. 107 (1997); Christopher C. Miller, To the Moon & Beyond: The United
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Some scholars have focused on the legal questions surrounding the
issues of sovereignty or jurisdiction in outer space, 132 but the most
popular issue in space law has been real property rights. 133 In
addressing real property, scholars typically view the establishment of
property rights as the first step in extending national sovereignty and
jurisdiction into space. 134  One of the more commonly discussed
solutions to the issue of private property in outer space has been the
creation of a system based on the "first in time" homesteading
principles used in the Nineteenth Century in the United States.
135
Other systems would see a more systematic approach to apportioning
property rights in outer space, 136 or even a complete moratorium on
colonization until all humankind has equal access to space travel and
colonization. 137 Finally, a small number of scholars contend that the
Outer Space Treaty can work as it is currently written, so long as
States and the Future of International Space Law, 35 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.
REv. 121 (2012).
132. See, e.g., Tannenwald, supra note 131.
133. Looking through the sources of footnote 131 will reveal that almost all of
them prioritize private property rights as the essential element in any proposed
amendments to outer space law.
134. For scholars that are specifically concerned with the issue of national
appropriation of space assets, see Widgerow, supra note 99; Collins, supra note
131; Thomas, supra note 131; Gruner, supra note 131. For scholars primarily
interested in private property rights, see, e.g., Adolph, supra note 131; Buxton,
surpa note 60, at 689-707; Risely, supra note 131, at 47-70.
135. The primary argument is that it would encourage (and require) people and
companies to physically move to outer space in order to reap the rewards for doing
so, with the risk and reward tied up in their ability to physically appropriate
celestial objects. See, e.g., Gruner, supra note 131. For more information about
homesteading in the 19 th Century, see An Act to secure Homesteads to actual
Settlers on the Public Domain, 12 Stat. 392 (1962) (The Second Session of the 37th
Congress authorized the bill in order to provide a mechanism for U.S. citizens to
settle on unincorporated public lands, which they could purchase after they
occupied the land for a period of five years), available at
http://www.loc.gov/law/help/statutes-at-large/37th-congress/c37.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/2MPQ-AUJV.
136. See, e.g., Collins, supra note 131 (Arguing that there must be a system to
allocate private and sovereign ownership of real property on Mars, before the first
humans arrive, in order to created appropriate incentives and limits to ownership).
137. See Buxton, surpa note 60, at 689-707 (Arguing that such a moratorium
should be implemented to facilitate the application of the common heritage fairly
across all nations and people).
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proper international organizations are established to administer the
use of outer space resources.138
Whichever proposal, if any, is eventually adopted into international
law, the principles of national sovereignty and jurisdiction will be
required to adapt to the established system of property rights. The
current system recognizes property rights for the people or groups
that create, launch, or purchase ships, satellites, and space stations:
the jurisdiction and sovereignty of governments over that property
emerges from the citizenship of the owner or launching state. 139 A
system that recognizes another form of property rights will create a
new ecosystem of laws that emerge from those ownership principles.
However, under the current legal ecosystem, it is possible to achieve
the goals of H.R. 2617 without amending, revoking, or superseding
the Outer Space Treaty in its current form.
140
E. Current state of Space Laws
The key question to ask in preparation of our discussion of H.R.
2617 is this: what are the contours of modem space law and how can
138. Such scholars include authors that argue for the creation of an international
licensing system that could comply with the Outer Space Treaty, and others urge
that the full adoption of the Moon Agreement would resolve the most pressing
issues of resource extraction. See Ricky Lee, Creating a Practical Legal
Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space
(Dec. 4, 2009) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Murdoch University), available at
http://researchrepository.murdoch.edu.au/1665/2/leeO2Whole.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/A648-UKJE; Kali N. Murray, Of Gardens and Streets: A
Differentiated Model of Property in International and National Space Law, 32 J.
SPACE L. 361 (2006); Hertzfeld and von der Dunk, supra note 87; Paul Tobias,
Opening the Pandora's Box of Space Law, 28 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
299 (2004-2005).
Another option is also explored where the Outer Space Treaty only speaks
to nations, not individuals, and would not preclude nations from recognizing
private ownership of spatial real estate. See Alan Wasser and Douglas Jobes,
Space Settlements, Property Rights, and International Law: Could a Lunar
Settlement Claim the Lunar Real Estate It Needs to Survive?, 73 J. AIR L. & COM.
37, 37-78 (2008).
139. Although it is not quite so straightforward in international law, see Lee,
supra note 43, at 229-33.
140. See infra Section IV.
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modem legal developments be understood in light of the
requirements of the Outer Space Treaty?
141
The first and most important principle in modem space law is the
ability for anyone to own manmade objects launched into space, and
the total prohibition of real estate ownership on celestial objects. The
second principle is that ownership, sovereignty, and jurisdiction all
exist in outer space under certain conditions. It exists when there is a
man-made object launched into space from Earth, but then only that
object and any people on board it can be subject to the sovereignty
and jurisdiction of the launching state. The definition of what
constitutes object made on Earth and sent to space, or which
government may claim jurisdiction over which objects and people is
up for debate, but sovereignty and jurisdiction are available. The
third and final principle is that governments can work together
through bilateral means to create agreements that do not violate the
Outer Space Treaty. Such agreements are able to be far clearer in
their definition of the rights, sovereignty, and jurisdiction than the
Outer Space Treaty, as was demonstrated with the Space Station
Agreement. Each of these points will be considered in our analysis
of H.R. 2617.
III. H.R. 2617 AND THE THREE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS
The stated purpose of H.R. 2617 is to preserve, protect, and
improve public understanding of the Apollo landing sites, and the
artifacts left behind on the Moon.142 Alongside this general purpose,
the statute has six provisions that list the means through which
Representatives Edwards and Johnson seek to achieve their goal. 1
43
This section will not exhaustively examine each provision of the bill,
but look at those parts that directly implicate the Outer Space Treaty
141. In addition to the sources cited above; see also Gabriele Wohl, Outer Space,
Inc.: Transmitting Business, Ethics, and Policy Across the Universe, 111 W. VA. L.
REv. 311 (2008-2009); R. Berkeley, Space Law versus Space Utilization: The
Inhibition of Private Industry in Outer Space, (1996-7) 15 WIS. J. INT'L L.J. 221-
43; Statement of the Board of Directors of the International Institute of Space Law
(IISL) On Claims to Property Rights Regarding the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies (2004), available at http://www.iislweb.org/docs/IISLOuter Space
Treaty Statement.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/32AZ-HS4L.
142. H.R. 2617, supra note 1, at § 3.
143. Id.
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and the three fundamental problems. By examining each provision in
turn, this section will highlight the parts of the bill that need to
change in order to adhere to the Outer Space Treaty.
A. H.R. 2617
The primary problem facing H.R. 2617 is Section 4, the definitions
section of the bill. The definition of the Apollo Landing Sites
National Historical Park would include "all areas of the Moon where
astronauts and instruments.., touched the lunar surface." 144 This
definition clearly violates the terms of the Outer Space Treaty and
implicates all three fundamental problems. First, it implicates the
prohibition against owning property by claiming ownership of real
estate on the Moon by the United States. Second, it implicates the
prohibition against extending national sovereignty to outer space by
explicitly extending the sovereignty of the United States to portions
of the Moon. Finally, it implicates the prohibition against extending
a nation's jurisdiction to space by proposing that portions of the
Moon should fall under the jurisdiction and control and laws of the
United States.
Section 5 of the bill backs away from the language in Section 4 by
listing the parts of the park that would consist exclusively of the
"artifacts on the surface of the Moon" associated with the Apollo
missions without any reference to the definition established in
Section 4.145 The exclusion of Section 4's definition in Section 5
does not resolve the definition in the first instance, nor does it resolve
the problems under the Outer Space Treaty in extending national
sovereignty to the Moon. In addition, even if Section 5 is read to be
compliant with the Outer Space Treaty, then it creates the
unprecedented establishment of a national park made up solely of
chattel property, which may present unanticipated problems in
administering the proposed National Park.
In the following section, Section 6(a)(3) presents a legal quandary
by requiring the administrating agency to follow all applicable
international treaties. 146 Under this section, the applicable portions of
the Outer Space Treaty would appear to require the administering
144. Id. at § 4.
145. Id. at § 5.
146. Id. at § 6.
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agency to disband itself in order to prevent the United States from
extending its sovereignty and jurisdiction to the Moon's surface.
Alternatively, it would require the agency to ignore or redefine
Section 4's definition of the park to one that is compliant with the
Outer Space Treaty's prohibition on the extension of United States
ownership, sovereignty, and jurisdiction to the Moon's surface. In
other words, Section 6(a)(3) would require the administering agency
to either violate the terms of the Outer Space Treaty, or violate the
terms of H.R. 2617, which is not a position that an agency should be
placed.
Finally, Section 8 of the bill requires that the administering agency
submit the Apollo Lunar Landing Sites National Park for
consideration to the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) as a possible World Heritage
Site. 147 The requirements for becoming a World Heritage Site
include that the site is one of either cultural or natural world heritage.
This is defined to mean that the site is a monument, group of
buildings, a combined work of nature and man, or some outstanding
natural site of universal value. 14 8 While the Apollo landing sites
would undoubtedly qualify under the definition, an additional
requirement is that the site must be owned by a country; a
requirement that implicates both the Outer Space Treaty and the three
fundamental problems on the same basis as Section 4.149 While it is
laudable to seek international approval for the protection of the
Apollo landing sites, it is counterproductive to claim ownership of
parts of the Moon against the express terms of the Outer Space
Treaty.
147. Id. at § 8.
148. See U.N. Educ., Sci., and Cultural Org., Intergovernmental Comm. for the
Prot. of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Operational Guidelines for the
Implementation of the World Heritage Convention 13, WHC 13/01, (2013),
available at http://whc.unesco.org/archive/opguidel3-en.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/W8RG-PNG4.
149. The idea that a World Heritage Site could be located on an un-owned
territory is not contemplated in the treaty text. See Convention Concerning the
Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage art. 3-5, Nov. 16, 1972, 27
U.S.T. 37, T.I.A.S. No. 8226, available at http://whc.unesco.org/archive/
convention-en.pdf [hereinafter World Heritage Convention], archived at
http://perma.cc/E9A6-G2K9.
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B. Fundamental Problems and the
Apollo Lunar Landing Sites National Historical Park
There are three questions that must be answered about the legal
status of the Apollo landing sites before the United States may
incorporate those sites as a new national park: (1) can the United
States own the property used to create the park, (2) may the United
States extend its sovereignty to the property used to create the park,
and (3) does the United States have jurisdiction to enforce the
creation of the park? 150 As to the first question, it is indisputable that
the Outer Space Treaty prohibits ownership of real property on the
Moon, but allows for the ownership of the devices left behind by the
Apollo astronauts. 151 As to the second question, the United States
would be able to extend its sovereignty to the devices left behind by
the Apollo astronauts, but not to the surface of the Moon. 152 As to
the third question, it may be possible to consider the devices left
behind by the Apollo astronauts as jurisdictionally part of a national
park, but this status alone will not be able to protect and preserve the
devices in situ on the Moon.
Even though the United States can legitimately extend its
sovereignty, laws, and ownership over the devices left on the Moon
by the Apollo astronauts under the Outer Space Treaty, H.R. 2617's
attempt to protect both the devices and the Moon's surface
overreaches. In order to adhere to the Outer Space Treaty, the bill
would need to remove Section 4's definition of the park as inclusive
of real property on the Moon. The main problem with such an edit is
that there are footsteps and other changes to the surface of the Moon
from the Apollo astronauts' trips that would not be preserved without
a property interest in lunar real estate, because the way to preserve
those effects would be to physically protect the Moon's surface.
Under the Outer Space Treaty, the United States is explicitly
prohibited from extending its sovereignty to include celestial
objects.153 But while the plain language would preclude the United
150. Ultimately, the question is "is it moral or ethical to claim the land, whatever
the terms of the Outer Space Treaty?"
151. See supra note 87.
152. See supra note 101.
153. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 22; see also Adams, supra note 78; Jenks,
supra note 101.
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States from claiming sovereignty over the real property of the
Moon, 154 this prohibition becomes less clear under the precedent set
by the Space Station Agreement and the recognition of sovereign
interests in satellites. 155 There is an implied claim to legitimate
sovereign interest inherent in and around the Apollo objects; not
enough to extend national sovereignty permanently, but enough to
safeguard the objects owned by the United States while they remain
on the Moon.
In the context of H.R. 2617, the United States would only have
jurisdiction over the artifacts themselves, not the lunar real estate. 56
However, this jurisdiction would extend to United States citizens and
businesses visiting the artifacts, 157 as well as any other person
directly interacting with them. 158 This situation provides the United
States the ability to achieve the desired results of H.R. 2617 without
owning the Moon in contravention of the Outer Space Treaty.
159
In order to comply with international treaties, the language of H.R.
2617 would need to be modified to specifically exclude any interest
in real property on the Moon, including that real property that the
artifacts rest on. Unfortunately, according to NASA's report on what
is needed to safeguard the Apollo landing sites, a far greater degree
of regulation and control would be required. 160 The only legitimate
option that would allow the goals of H.R. 2617 to be achieved under
the Outer Space Treaty would be to regulate the ships and the people
who may visit the Apollo landing sites. There are three possible
ways to achieve this goal under current treaties.
154. Id.
155. See supra Section II(B) and (C).
156. See supra Section II(C).
157. Pursuant to the terms of the Outer Space Treaty. See Outer Space Treaty,
supra note 22.
158. The jurisdiction would not extend to the Moon's surface, see supra Section
11(C).
159. See infra Section IV(C).
160. NAT'L AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMIN., supra note 5.
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IV. MODELS OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION FOR
RESOLVING THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS
The three methods that the United States can pursue in order to
resolve the fundamental problems facing the establishment of the
Apollo Lunar Landing Sites National Historical Park are: (1)
international cooperation, (2) bilateral agreement with interested
nations, and (3) domestic action that has international effect.
A. International Cooperation
One of the popular proposals for protecting the Apollo landing
sites is establishing the landing sites as a World Heritage Site under
the purview of UNESCO. 161 As outlined above, the qualifications for
becoming a World Heritage Site requires that a nation owns and
maintains the site, which would be prohibited under the Outer Space
Treaty. 162 This requirement is demonstrated by the creation of the
2001 Convention on the Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage,
which separately protects underwater cultural landmarks where no
government may claim ownership, sovereignty, or jurisdiction over
seafloor.163 A similar convention on the protection of outer spaceheritage could be created under the purview of UNESCO, but would
161. See generally, THE POLITICS OF WORLD HERITAGE: NEGOTIATING TOURISM
AND CONSERVATION (David Harrison and Michael Hitchcock, eds., 2005); Singh
Rana Harminderpal, The Common Heritage of Mankind &(and) the Final Frontier:
A Revaluation of Values Constituting the International Legal Regime for Outer
Space Activities, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 225, 225 (1994-1995); Dirk Spennemann,
Extreme cultural tourism from Antarctica to the Moon, 34 ANNALS OF TOURISM
RES. 898, 898-918 (2007); T. F. Rogers, Safeguarding tranquility base: why the
Earth's Moon base should become a World Heritage Site, 20 SPACE POL'Y 5, 5-6
(2004); Dirk Spennemann, The ethics of treading on Neil Armstrong's footprints,
20 SPACE POL'Y 279, 279-90 (2004); Dirk Spennemann, Out of this World: Issues
of Managing Tourism and Humanity's Heritage on the Moon, 12 INT'L J. OF
HERITAGE STUD. 356, 356-71 (2006); Christopher Hearsey, Universal
conservationism: a proposal to establish world heritage sites beyond Earth, in
AIAA SPACE 2009 CONF. PROC. (2009); Justin Walsh, Protection of humanity's
cultural and historic heritage in space, 28 SPACE POL'Y 234, 234-43 (2012).
162. Compare World Heritage Convention, supra note 149, at art. 3-5; with
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 22, at art. II.
163. See Convention on the Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage art. 1,
Feb. 11,2001, 41 I.L.M. 40, 2562 U.N.T.S. 51 [hereinafter UCH Convention].
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require an international effort to achieve, not a bill in the United
States House of Representatives.
Furthermore, the act of seeking an international solution may call
the current treaties and agreements into question, which could result
in the amendment, supersession, or revocation of those treaties.
While some scholars would welcome this as an opportunity to
reconfigure space law to something more accommodating to private
industry, and to the ultimate benefit of the Apollo landing sites,164 the
process of amending treaties is not straightforward and may not lead
to the results hoped for by scholars, nor by Representatives Edwards
and Johnson. There may be a time and a place for an international
realignment towards different principles of space exploration and
exploitation, but international treaty re-negotiation it is not necessary
to achieve the protections sought in H.R. 2617. Moreover, other
possibilities exist that are under the direct control of the United States
rather than the United Nations.
B. Bilateral Agreement
There is legal precedent for the establishment of internationally
protected areas through bilateral negotiations in lieu of international
treaties. 16 5 The bilateral establishment of protected areas may be
seen in the mutual administration, protection, and management of the
Saint Croix Island International Historic Site.1 66 The St. Croix site
was created with the cooperation of both the United States and
Canadian governments when it was recognized that St. Croix held
important historic value to both countries.167 Both sides negotiatedthe site's joint protection under the United States and Canadian
164. See supra note 131.
165. See, e.g., Jos6 A. Cisneros and Valerie J. Naylor, Uniting La Frontera: the
ongoing efforts to establish a transboundary park, 41 ENV'T: SCI. & POL'Y FOR
SUSTAINABLE DEV. 12, 13-14 (1999) (Discussing US-Canadian parks and a
proposed US-Mexican park); Jim Johnston, Cross-Border Approaches to Protected
Areas, Heritage Conservation, and Tourism: A Parks Canada Perspective, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE PARKS RESEARCH FORUM OF ONTARIO 75 (2006) (Stating
that over 188 such trans-border protected areas exist).
166. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, NAT'L PARK SERV., FACILITIES
DEVELOPMENT PLAN FOR SAINT CROIX ISLAND INTERNATIONAL HISTORIC SITE 2-3
(2009).
167. Id.
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governments, 168 and although no other countries were part of the
negotiations, both countries were able to establish a well protected,
preserved, and managed International Park.169 On this basis the St.
Croix park could serve as an example to the United States on how it
might establish similar protections for the Apollo landing sites.
Unlike the requirements of a UNESCO World Heritage Site, a
bilaterally negotiated and administered system to preserve the Apollo
landing sites would only require the interest and desire of other
nations to create those protections.17  With the Apollo landing sites
being of such historic significance to all people on Earth, there
should be the sufficient interest to protect them through a bilateral
treaty. All that would be required is for the United States to enter
into negotiations with other space-faring nations in order to protect
those sites.
The one outstanding problem with this proposal is that having the
Apollo landing sites fall under a coalition of governments may still
violate the terms of the Outer Space Treaty unless careful
consideration is given to what is required under the treaty. The
investigation into whether some form of collective ownership of
lunar real estate would pass scrutiny under the Outer Space Treaty
would be an interesting topic for scholarly discussion, but not the one
explored in this essay.17 It is sufficient to say that this would be a
good option under the circumstances, but that a better option would
be to proceed through domestic legislation first.
C. Domestic Action
The course of conduct advocated in this essay is one that would
swiftly achieve the goals of H.R. 2617 and also comply with the
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. As demonstrated by the fact that Saint Croix Island is protected by the US
and Canada, but not on the list of World Heritage Sites, receiving only a brief
mention in UNESCO's 500 page 2012 report on sites being considered for World
Heritage Status, see U.N. Educ., Sci., and Cultural Org., World Heritage Comm.,
Evaluations of Nominations of Cultural and Mixed Properties to the World
Heritage List 26, WHC-12/36.COM/INF.8B, 36th Sess. (2012), available at
http://whc.unesco.org/archive/2012/whcl2-36com-8Blinf-en.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/T6F2-CE9G.
171. Although mention is made of the topic, see supra Section II(D).
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terms of the Outer Space Treaty. A purely domestic approach could
provide for the protection of the Apollo landing sites by placing
restrictions on the citizens and corporations of the United States.
This would allow the United States government to pursue legal action
against individuals over whom they already have jurisdiction. By
doing so they could monitor, protect, and control the space around
the Apollo landing sites in a manner that complies with the Outer
Space Treaty. Once such restrictions are in place, the United States
would be able to engage in bilateral negotiations with other space-
faring nations, asking them to similarly restrict their own citizens and
businesses. This course of action would require that the current text
of H.R. 2617 be replaced with a new notion of what is to occur: no
longer focusing on the formation of a national park, but on regulating
the actions of citizens and businesses seeking to visit the Apollo
landing sites. What wording the change may use is up to Congress,
but it could be as simple as empowering an agency to promulgate
regulations about such activities 172 or as complex as adopting the
suggested regulations of NASA.
This option would be wholly under the control of the United
States, apart from our obligations under the Outer Space Treaty.
Moreover, a similar course of action has been effective in the past.
There is a significant success story in the protection of the R.M.S.
Titanic that is based upon this option, and shows how domestic
legislation can be expanded to include both bilateral and international
agreements. 173 It reflects how the United States may take appropriate
action now, and continue pursuing bilateral and international
solutions. 174 Moreover, this course of action would facilitate
172. Such as NASA, the Office of Space Commercialization, the Federal
Aviation Administration, or even the creation of a new administrative agency.
Although it appears that the Federal Aviation Administration may be moving
towards such regulatory authority in the absence of explicit Congressional
authorization, see Irene Klotz, Exclusize - The FAA: regulating business on the
moon, REUTERS (Feb. 3, 2015, 8:08am), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/
02/03/us-usa-moon-business-idUSKBNOL715F20150203, archived at
http://perma.cc/HWL7-NVGW.
173. See generally Section IV(C).
174. Insofar as appropriate action has and may be take on behalf of the Titanic,
see, e.g., Matthew E. Zekala, Liability and Salvage: Titanic Jurisprudence In
United States Federal Court, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1075 (2012); Margaret E.
Leshikar-Denton, Cooperation is the Key: We Can Protect the Underwater
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international cooperation since we would be modeling the behavior
we seek for other nations to emulate rather than claim ownership of
real estate that is forbidden under the Outer Space Treaty.
The success of the Titanic's protection emerges from a domestic
act of Congress, the R.M.S. Titanic Maritime Memorial Act of
1986.175 The act requires that the United Sates will work with other
countries to preserve the resting site of the Titanic, and prohibit any
person under United States jurisdiction from altering, disturbing, or
salvaging anything from the site. 176 The act limits the United States'
ability to enforce the act except to those over whom it already has
legitimate jurisdiction, expressly disclaiming any extension of
ownership, sovereignty, or jurisdiction over the R.M.S. Titanic.177
Under this act, the Titanic became protected from any person,
company, or organization based in the United States that sought to
salvage or disturb the Titanic in any way. 178 The success of the act
domestically helped to foster the involvement of other nations. 179
Negotiations following the passage of the 1986 Act eventually lead
to the 1997 bilateral negotiations that lead to the creation of the
Agreement Concerning the Shipwrecked Vessel RMS Titanic of
2003.180 As a bilateral agreement between the United States, Canada,
Cultural Heritage, 5 J. OF MAR. ARCHAEOLOGY 85, 85-95 (2010); Marian Leigh
Miller, Underwater Cultural Heritage: Is the Titanic Still in Peril as Courts Battle
over the Future of the Historical Vessel, 20 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 345 (2006);
Sarah Dromgoole, The International Agreement for the Protection of the Titanic:
Problems and Prospects, 37 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 1, 1-31 (2006); Ole Varmer,
RMS Titanic, in HERITAGE AT RISK 14 (2006).
175. R.M.S. Titanic Maritime Memorial Act of 1986, 16 U.S.C. § 450rr et seq.
(1986), available at http://www.gc.noaa.gov/documents/TitanicMemorialAct.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/LGA4-79AJ; see also Guidelines for Research,
Exploration and Salvage of RMS Titanic 66 FR 18,905 (Apr. 12, 2001).
176. 16 U.S.C. § 450rr(b)(2).
177. 16 U.S.C. § 450rr-6.
178. 16 U.S.C. § 450rr-5.
179. 16 U.S.C. § 450rr-3; 16 U.S.C. § 450rr-4.
180. Agreement Concerning the Shipwrecked Vessel RMS Titanic, U.S.-Can.-
Fr.-U.K., Nov. 6, 2003, available at http://www.gc.noaa.gov/documents/titanic-
agreement.pdf [hereinafter Titanic Agreement], archived at http://perma.cc/ZP2L-
8V9M. The agreement was signed by the United States on June 18, 2004, see U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE, OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISOR, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES
PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 715-16 (2004), available at
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France, and the United Kingdom, 181 it requires that the parties to the
agreement take "all reasonable measures" to conserve both the
Titanic and its artifacts. 182 It is notable that even though the
agreement is limited to the four signatories, and is not binding on
other nations, it has the effect of safeguarding the Titanic from the
people most likely to have the technology and desire to collect
salvage from the Titanic.
The international attention drawn from the domestic legislation and
the bilateral negotiations lead to the creation of the UNESCO
Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage of
2001.183 It should be noted that the resting site of the Titanic is not a
World Heritage Site, but it has some of the same features of one
under the mechanisms of the treaty, which protect Underwater
Cultural Heritage sites in international waters. 184 The Titanic's status
under the UNESCO convention provides important international
recognition and protection to the Titanic, at the same time much of
the practical protections come from the bilateral treaty between the
nations with the technology, interest, and ability to go to the site of
the R.M.S. Titanic.
185
The key to the success of the first R.M.S. Titanic Maritime
Memorial Act of 1986 was that it did not purport to establish a strong
property interest in the R.M.S. Titanic. Rather, the law sought to
protect and preserve the site from citizens of the Unites State and did
so through means that did not challenge the legitimacy of
international interest in the sea floor. The same results are possible
for the Apollo landing sites in a revised H.R. 2617.
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/139391 .pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/UZ86-67BG.
181. Titanic Agreement, supra note 180, at 6.
182. Id. at art. 3, 4.
183. See UCH Convention, supra note 163, at art. 1; see also Mariano J. Aznar
and Ole Varmer, The Titanic as Underwater Cultural Heritage: Challenges to its
Legal International Protection, 44 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 96, 96-112(2013); Ole
Varmer, Jefferson Gray, and David Alberg, United States: responses to the 2001
UNESCO convention on the protection of the underwater cultural heritage, 5 J. OF
MAR. ARCHAEOLOGY 129, 129 (2010).
184. See generally UCH Convention, supra note 163.
185. Especially since the US is not a signatory to the UN Convention, see
Varmer, Gray, and Alberg, supra note 183.
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H.R. 2617 will not protect the Apollo landing sites when it takes an
approach that is contrary to international treaties, agreements, and
conventions by claiming national ownership over parts of the Moon.
If this bill were to take the same approach as the R.M.S. Titanic
Maritime Memorial Act of 1986, it could be far more successful.
Such a bill would protect the Apollo landing sites from the citizens
and businesses of the United States, those protections would start
immediately, the bill could serve to advance bilateral and
international negotiations, and the law would not violate the terms of
the Outer Space Treaty.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
Because it is only a matter of time before the occurrence of private
space travel to the Apollo landing sites, there needs to be some
restrictions in place to properly preserve the sites for future
generations. Those protections must be as robust and as forward-
looking as possible but at the same time fit within our existing laws.
Under our treaty obligations, the best option is for space-faring
nations to take the responsibility upon themselves and begin issuing
protections for those sites just as Representatives Edwards and
Johnson have sought to accomplish.
Ultimately, the type of protection that is necessary to preserve the
Apollo landing sites will require that the Outer Space Treaty and
others to be repealed, amended, or superseded. Because ownership
rights in outer space real estate, once it becomes practical, will be
inevitable, a system of laws that anticipates and encourages
responsible development would be welcome. This desire, however,
does nothing to mitigate the treaties that are currently in place. It is
our responsibility to adhere to these laws until they are changed, and
we cannot do so by enacting a bill that violates some of the
fundamental elements of the Outer Space Treaty.
Because it is possible to preserve the Apollo landing sites under the
present laws, we should do so. H.R. 2617 needs to be changed in
focus and in form. Instead of a being a bill that seeks to extend the
jurisdiction of the United States to the Moon, it should seek to
restrain domestic companies and individuals from damaging those
sites. Instead of a being a bill that seeks to establish a national park
and engage international bodies at the same time, it should
determinedly seek to protect the Apollo landing sites from the only
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people it has the authority to protect them from: citizens and
businesses of the United States. By doing so, the United States will
set an example of what may be achieved under the restraints of the
Outer Space Treaty, and may foster the adoption of similar
legislation worldwide. The United States should once more be a
leader in a race to the Moon, by protecting the achievements of the
first Space Race for many generations to come.
